PDF | This paper reviews current design standards and test methods for blast- resistant glazing design and compares a typical design outcome with Download full-text PDF .. design guidelines in ASTM F (ASTM a) have been. Download full-text PDF . Besides these two standards, ASTM F (in ASTM F specifies an equivalent 3-sec design load with the. Sign In · View Account▹ · Home; ASTM F standard by ASTM International, 08/10/ PDF;; Immediate download; $; Add to Cart.
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ASTM F is a standard practice for specifying an equivalent 3-Second Duration design Print/export. Create a book · Download as PDF · Printable version. DoD Security Engineering Facilities Design Manual (FOUO). © JEI Design Load = Equivalent 3 second design load ASTM F ▫ Info Required – . This file was downloaded from: portal7.info .. ASTM F 09 recommends using either structural silicone sealant or adhesive glazing.
Glass plies used to construct laminated glass are recommended to be either annealed or heat strengthened glass. As a minimum, insulating glass shall use laminated glass for the inboard protected side lite. The width of glazing tape shall be at least equal to two times but not more than four times the thickness designation of the glass to which it adheres. The width of silicone or glazing tape is referred to as bite and is shown and discussed in Guide C The system shall be designed to ensure that the glazing fails prior to the framing system that supports the glazing and its attachment to the structural framing system.
These tests were performed as part of the proof-of-capabilities study in the WhAM development. Enclos provided eight identical window assemblies including glazing, mullions, and connectors. This paper summarizes the test modules, test set-up, instrumentation, test results, and analysis results. Additional post-test analyses evaluated the overall system response with rigid anchors and compared measured loads imposed at each anchor point on the structural supports i.
The GFPM uses a finite difference model after Vallabhan and Wang to correlate the lateral pressure on a given piece of glass to its stress distribution. The stress is then modified to account for load duration and biaxiality, which is referenced as the equivalent stress. The equivalent stress is incorporated into a Weibull distribution where empirical flaw parameters m, k define the shape of the Weibull distribution and relate equivalent stress to the probability of failure.
Use of the stress distribution factor, J, eliminates the need to explicitly map the relationship between lateral load and stress in the glass. However, the stress distribution factor is based on testing of AN glass only. To accommodate the increased strength of heat strengthened and tempered glass, a strength multiplier was added to the model which has a similar effect as altering the k parameter of the Weibull distribution found in the GFPM.
Therefore, the m parameter is the only variable used to calibrate differing strengths of glass in addition to the embedded strength factor.
Lack of funding alone will not be cause to reduce any standard. Service Secretaries and Agency Heads will ensure compliance with these standards and will issue guidance for their implementation. That guidance will include direction to require the installation commander to notify or seek approval from a major command or claimant or higher headquarters level if a new construction of renovation project, or a leased facility, will UFC 8 October Including change 1, 19 January not meet any one or more of the standards.
Heads of DoD Components will establish plans and procedures to mitigate risks in such situations. Geographic combatant commanders may establish additional guidance to ensure uniform and consistent application of these standards within their areas of operations or to account for any special circumstances.
When the best procedures, proper training, and appropriate equipment fail to deter terrorist attacks, adherence to these standards goes far in mitigating the possibility of mass casualties from terrorist attacks against DoD personnel in the buildings in which they work and live.
Although predicting the specific threat to everyone is not possible, proper planning and integration of those plans provides a solid foundation for preventing, and if necessary reacting, when terrorist incidents or other emergencies unfold. An effective planning process facilitates the necessary decision making, clarifies roles and responsibilities, and ensures support actions generally go as planned.
A team consisting of the chain of command and key personnel from all appropriate functional areas who have an interest in the building and its operation executes this planning process. This team is responsible for identifying requirements for the project, facilitating the development of supporting operational procedures, obtaining adequate resources, and properly supporting all other efforts needed to prudently enhance protection of the occupants of every inhabited DoD building.
DoD Handbook Mandatory DoD minimum antiterrorism standards for new and existing inhabited buildings are contained in Appendix B. Additional recommended measures for new and existing inhabited buildings are included in Appendix C. Mandatory DoD minimum antiterrorism standards for expeditionary and temporary structures are contained in Appendix D. The standards and recommendations in this UFC include a combination or performance and prescriptive requirements.
In many cases where there are minimum prescriptive requirements such as standoff distance or glazing thickness, those requirements are based on performance standards and there are generally provisions to allow those performances to be provided through alternate means where those means will result in equivalent levels of protection. The intent of these standards is to minimize the possibility of mass casualties in buildings or portions of buildings owned, leased, privatized, or otherwise occupied, managed, or controlled by or for DoD.
These standards provide appropriate, implementable, and enforceable measures to establish a level of protection against terrorist attacks for all inhabited DoD buildings where no known threat of terrorist activity currently exists. While complete protection against all potential threats for every inhabited building is cost prohibitive, the intent of these standards can be achieved through prudent master planning, real estate acquisition, and design and construction practices.
The financial impact of these standards will be significantly less than the economic and intangible costs of a mass casualty event. While it is feasible to apply these standards to new construction as of the effective dates established herein, applying them to all existing construction and to all leased facilities as of those dates would not be feasible. The intent, therefore, is to bring existing buildings into compliance with these standards over time as major investments are made in them or as leases are renewed such that eventually all inhabited DoD buildings comply with these standards.
The levels of protection provided by these standards meet the intent described above and establish a foundation for the rapid application of additional protective measures in a higher threat environment.
These standards may be supplemented where specific terrorist threats are identified, where more stringent local standards apply, or where local commanders dictate additional measures. Detailed descriptions of the levels of protection are provided in Chapter 2 and UFC Where DoD Component standards such as geographic Combatant Commander standards address unique requirements, those standards will be incorporated in accordance with their implementing directives, but not to the exclusion of these standards.
Where a design basis threat is identified whose mitigation requires protective measures beyond those required by these standards or DoD Component standards, those measures will be developed in accordance with the provisions of UFC The provisions of UFC include the design criteria that will be the basis for the development of the protective measures, estimates of the costs of those measures, and detailed guidance for developing the measures required to mitigate the identified threat.
The design criteria include the assets to be protected, the threat to those assets, and the desired level of protection.
Use of UFC will ensure uniform application, development, and cost estimation of protective measures throughout DoD. These antiterrorism standards establish criteria to minimize the potential for mass casualties and progressive collapse from a terrorist attack.
DoD The explosive safety and antiterrorism standards address hazards associated with unique events; UFC 8 October Including change 1, 19 January therefore, they specify different levels of protection. Compliance with both standards is required. Where conflicts arise, the more stringent criteria will govern. These standards apply to all DoD Components, to all DoD inhabited buildings, billeting, and high occupancy family housing, and to all DoD expeditionary and temporary structures in accordance with the following: Implementation of these standards is mandatory for all new construction regardless of funding source in accordance with the following: The provisions of the Interim Standards will apply to those projects.
Due to minor changes between these standards and the Interim Standards, projects prior to the Fiscal Year Program should comply with these standards where possible.
These standards apply to new construction funded under host-nation agreements or from other funding sources starting in Fiscal Year or as soon as negotiations with the foreign governments can be completed. Projects funded prior to that fiscal year should comply with these standards where possible. These standards will apply to existing facilities starting with the Fiscal Year program when triggered as specified below, regardless of funding source.
For existing leased buildings see paragraph Implementation of these standards is mandatory when any portion of a building is modified from its current use to that of an inhabited building, billeting, high occupancy family housing, or a primary gathering building for one year or more.
Examples would include a warehouse low occupancy being converted to administrative inhabited use and an inhabited administrative building being converted to a primary gathering building or billeting. Such replacements may require window frame modification or replacement. Inhabited additions to existing inhabited buildings will comply with the minimum standards for new buildings. DoD personnel occupying leased buildings deserve the same level of protection as those in DoD-owned buildings. Implementation of these standards is therefore mandatory for all facilities leased for DoD use and for those buildings in which DoD receives a space assignment from another government agency except as established below.
This requirement is intended to cover all situations, including General Services Administration space, privatized buildings, and host-nation and other foreign government buildings. This requirement is applicable for all new leases executed on or after 1 October and to renewal or extension of any existing lease on or after 1 October Leases executed prior to the above fiscal years will comply with these standards where possible.
Buildings that are built to lease to DoD as of the effective date established above will comply with the standards for new construction. New leases or renewals of leases of existing buildings will trigger the minimum standards for existing buildings in accordance with the effective dates established above. Implementation of these standards is mandatory for all expeditionary and temporary structures that meet the occupancy criteria for inhabited or primary gathering buildings or billeting.
See Appendix D for structure types that meet the expeditionary and temporary structures criteria. These standards apply to all new expeditionary sites effective immediately. These standards will apply to all existing expeditionary activities beginning in Fiscal Year Prior to that fiscal year, existing expeditionary structures should comply with these standards where possible.
Any National Guard building that uses Federal funding for new construction, renovations, modifications, repairs, restorations, or leasing and that meets the applicability provisions above, will comply with these standards. Because buildings built by tenants on DoD installations may be taken over by DoD during their life cycles, memoranda of understanding or similar agreements between DoD components and tenants will require tenant-built buildings to comply with these standards, regardless of funding source.
For the purposes of these standards, tenant-built building occupancies will be calculated assuming that building occupants are DoD personnel. Unless DoD Components dictate otherwise, the following buildings are exempt from requirements of these standards as specified below. However, compliance with these standards for those buildings is recommended where possible.
In addition, there are some exemptions to elements of individual standards that are included in the text of those standards in appendix B. The rationale for all exemptions is detailed in chapter 2. These buildings are exempt from all provisions of these standards. These buildings are exempt from standoff distances to parking and roadways. All other standards apply. Stand-alone commercial facilities similar in size to those in paragraph An example of such a commercial facility would be a bank with a drive-through window.
These facilities are exempt from all provisions of these standards. These structures are exempt from standoff distances to parking and roadways. Transitional structures and spaces that will be occupied for less than one year and that are not billeting, high occupancy family housing, primary gathering buildings, or medical transitional structures, are exempt from standoff distances to parking and roadways.
Recruiting stations located in leased spaces are exempt from all provisions of these standards. Facilities designed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO or equivalent standards for collaterally protected, semi-hardened, protected, and hardened facilities are exempt from all provisions of these standards; however, the threats included in this standard should be incorporated into the design criteria for the military protective construction.
The inclusion of these standards into DoD construction or the inclusion of protective measures above the requirements of these standards will be incorporated into the appropriate construction programming documents such as the DD Form in accordance with DoD Component guidance. Refer to UFC for guidance on the costs for implementing these standards and for providing protective measures beyond these standards. For existing buildings, these standards are intended solely to correct design deficiencies to appropriately address emergent lifethreatening terrorist risks.
As a result, funding thresholds for Unspecified Minor Military Construction and Operations and Maintenance funding may be increased in accordance with 10 USC Sections a 1 and c 1.
Some information in these standards is exempt from mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. The sensitive information that is exempt is the explosive weights upon which the standoff distances are based, which is included in UFC Allowing potential aggressors to know the minimum explosive weights that all DoD inhabited buildings are designed to resist could constitute a vulnerability.
To minimize the possibility of that information being used against DoD personnel, the following provisions apply: Follow governing DoD and Component guidance for specific requirements for handling and distribution of For Official Use Only information.
In general, distribution of this UFC is unlimited. Government agencies and their contractors. In addition, where it is within Status of Forces Agreements SOFA or other similar information exchange agreements, the information in these standards may be distributed to host-nation elements for the purposes of their administration and design of host-nation funded or designed construction.
In addition, other documents that include information from these standards that are identified as For Official Use Only cannot be posted to web sites accessible to the general public.
For Official Use Only information may be posted to protected, non UFC 8 October Including change 1, 19 January publicly accessible web sites that comply with standards established by DoD for administration of web sites. The explosive weights from UFC upon which these standards are based will not be entered into the plans and specifications unless the plans and specifications are properly safeguarded.
Plans and specifications may be posted to the Internet in accordance with existing DoD Component guidance, but such documents will not include For Official Use Only information. All plans and specifications for inhabited buildings will include an annotation that cites the version of these standards that was used for design. Where design build contracts are employed, prospective contractors will be responsible for developing a design proposal for that project that may be impacted by provisions of these standards.
Where that is the case, consider alternate means to provide sufficient information to support their proposals.
Consider for example, either specifying specific design loads or specifying the required standoff distance and providing candidate structural systems that would allow for mitigation of the applicable explosive if that standoff was less than the minimum.
Once the design build contract is awarded the contractor will be eligible to receive this complete document for use in the development of the final design package, but that contractor will be responsible for protecting the integrity of the information throughout the contract and through any subcontracts into which that contractor might enter.
The Department of Defense remains the lead federal agency in balancing security threats with the protection of historic properties. The DoD abides by federal legislation on protecting cultural resources, and issues its own complementary policies for stewardship.
Historic properties and archaeological sites on military land are protected with other facilities from terrorism where there is a perceived threat to people and critical resources. In the wake of terrorist attacks against the armed forces and civilian personnel, the DoD believes firmly that this new anti-terrorism policy represents an undertaking that is directly associated with continuing and immediate threat of further terrorist attacks.
Implementation of this policy, however, will not supersede DoDs obligation to comply with federal laws regarding cultural resources to include the National Historic Preservation Act and the Archaeological Resources Protection Act. Personnel at installations abroad should coordinate with the host nation regarding possible adverse effects to cultural resources. Conversely, historic preservation compliance does not negate the requirement to implement DoD policy. An agency should not allow for prolonged consultations that conflict with the eminent need to implement anti-terrorism standards.
Preservation issues need to be quickly and effectively resolved, so as not to obstruct force protection efforts. As a result of this declaration, Federal agencies may use the emergency provisions of the Advisory Council on Historic Preservations regulations as outlined in 36 CFR Part In lieu of referring to those manuals, please see the guidance provided on the Security Engineering Working Group website.
The purpose of this chapter is to clarify the philosophy on which these standards are based, the design strategies that are their foundation, and the assumptions inherent in their provisions. Effective implementation of these standards depends on a reasonable understanding of the rationale for them. With this understanding, engineers and security and antiterrorism personnel can maximize the efficiency of their solutions for complying with these standards while considering sitespecific issues and constraints that might dictate measures beyond these minimums.
The overarching philosophy upon which this UFC is based is that comprehensive protection against the range of possible threats may be cost prohibitive, but that an appropriate level of protection can be provided for all DoD personnel at a reasonable cost.
That level of protection is intended to lessen the risk of mass casualties resulting from terrorist attacks.
Full implementation of these standards will provide some protection against all threats and will significantly reduce injuries and fatalities for the threats upon which these standards are based. The costs associated with those levels of protection are assumed to be less than the physical and intangible costs associated with incurring mass casualties. Furthermore, given what we know about terrorism, all DoD decision makers must commit to making smarter investments with our scarce resources and stop investing money in inadequate buildings that DoD personnel will have to occupy for decades, regardless of the threat environment.
There are three key elements of this philosophy that influence the implementation of these standards. Protective measures needed to provide the appropriate level of protection must be in place prior to the initiation of a terrorist attack. Incorporating those measures into DoD buildings is least expensive at the time those buildings are either being constructed or are undergoing major renovation, repair, restoration, or modification or when new leases are being established or leases are being renewed.
Because of that investment strategy, it is recognized that it may take significant time before all DoD buildings comply with these standards. Many of these standards significantly impact master planning. The most significant such impact will be in standoff distances. If standoff distances are not reserved they will be encroached upon and will not be available should they become necessary in a higher threat environment.
The master planning implications of these standards are not intended to be resolved overnight. They should be considered to be a blueprint for facilities and installations that will be implemented over decades as those facilities and installations evolve.
The philosophy of these standards is to build greater resistance to terrorist attack into all inhabited buildings. That philosophy affects the general practice of designing inhabited buildings. While these standards are not based on a known threat, they are intended to provide the easiest and most economical methods to minimize injuries and fatalities in the event of a terrorist attack. The primary UFC 8 October Including change 1, 19 January methods to achieve this outcome are to maximize standoff distance, to construct superstructures to avoid progressive collapse, and to reduce flying debris hazards.
These and related design issues are intended to be incorporated into standard design practice in the future. There are several major design strategies that are applied throughout these standards.
They do not account for all of the measures considered in these standards, but they are the most effective and economical in protecting DoD personnel from terrorist attacks. These strategies are summarized below. The primary design strategy is to keep terrorists as far away from inhabited DoD buildings as possible. The easiest and least costly opportunity for achieving the appropriate levels of protection against terrorist threats is to incorporate sufficient standoff distance into project designs.
While sufficient standoff distance is not always available to provide the standoff distances required for conventional construction, maximizing the available standoff distance always results in the most cost-effective solution. Maximizing standoff distance also ensures that there is opportunity in the future to upgrade buildings to meet increased threats or to accommodate higher levels of protection.
Provisions relating to preventing building collapse and building component failure are essential to effectively protecting building occupants, especially from fatalities. Those provisions apply regardless of standoff distance or the ability of a building to resist blast effects.
Designing those provisions into buildings during new construction or retrofitting during major renovations, repairs, restorations, or modifications of existing buildings is the most cost effective time to do that. In addition, structural systems that provide greater continuity and redundancy among structural components will help limit collapse in the event of severe structural damage from unpredictable terrorist acts.
In past explosive events where there was no building collapse, a high number of injuries resulted from flying glass fragments and debris from walls, ceilings, and fixtures non-structural features. Flying debris can be minimized through building design and avoidance of certain building materials and construction techniques. The glass used in most windows breaks at very low blast pressures, resulting in hazardous, dagger-like shards.
Minimizing those hazards through reduction in window numbers and sizes and through enhanced window construction has a major effect on limiting mass casualties. Window and door designs must treat glazing, frames, connections, and the structural components to which they are attached as an integrated system.
Hazardous fragments may also include secondary debris such as those from barriers and site furnishings. Effective design of building layout and orientation can significantly reduce opportunities for terrorists to target building occupants or injure large numbers of people. Effective design of heating, ventilation, and air conditioning HVAC systems can significantly reduce the potential for chemical, biological, and radiological agents being distributed throughout buildings.
Providing a timely means to notify building occupants of threats and what should be done in response to those threats reduces the risk of mass casualties. Many of the provisions of these standards facilitate opportunities to upgrade building protective measures in the future if the threat environment changes.