In Parablesfor 1/ Virtual Brian Massumi views the body and media such as thc post war French philosophy ofDeleuze, Guattari, and Foucault, Massumi. Request PDF on ResearchGate | On Aug 1, , Angela Ndalianis and others Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation by Brian Massumi. Biography: Brian Massumi specializes in philosophy, media theory, and visual culture. He is the author of Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation ( Duke University Press, ), A User's Guide to Capitalism and Download PDF.
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Brian Massumi. PARABLES FOR THE VIRTUAL. Movement,. Affect,. Sensation. Duke University Press Durham & London Brian Massumi_Introduction of Parables for the Virtual - Download as PDF File . pdf), Text File .txt) or read online. Brian Massumi is Professor of Communication at the Université de of the Despot (), Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation.
Shelves: academic-for-school An incredibly valuable stepping-stone to actually understanding Deleuze and Guattari. If you get Deleuze on your own, then you're a better person than I am and I owe you a batch of cookies. Sep 05, Andrew rated it it was amazing "which is more disgusting or pathetic it more or to throw a brick threw a courthouse window or to collect and label it? Masterson rated it it was ok I'm not sure if it was the writing, the concepts, or my own ignorance, but I had a lot of trouble understanding what this book was trying to say. It is supposed to be an easier to digest introduction to Deleuze and Guattari's Capitalism and Schizophrenia Aug 17, Andrew Fox rated it it was ok I will be reading this book forever. I don't know where I am or what's going on or what I am anymore, but I like it, whatever it is.
Massumi has lectured widely around the world, and his writings have been translated into more than fifteen languages. Since , he has collaborated with the SenseLab,  founded by Erin Manning  as an experimental "laboratory for thought in motion" operating at the intersection of philosophy, art, and activism.
Philosophy[ edit ] Massumi situates his work in the tradition of process philosophy , which he defines broadly to encompass a range of thinkers whose work privileges concepts of event and emergence.
He articulates process philosophy with William James's radical empiricism , which asserts the primacy of relation. This is the doctrine that relations are real, are directly experienced, and create their own terms. Theory of power[ edit ] Massumi's earliest work on the theory of power is two-pronged.
On the one hand, it examines processes of power centralization tending toward the absolutist state, which he broadly defines as fascist. Bush administration to serve as the framework for the "war on terror. He gives it the label "ontopower" the power to bring to be. It is allied Foucault's concept of "environmentality. He argues that this entwinement makes the capitalist economy a direct power formation in its own right. Massumi argues that there is no position "outside" capitalist power from which to critique or resist.
The word micropolitics does not refer to the scale at which action takes place, but rather to its mode. Following Spinoza , he defines affect as "the capacity to affect and be affected. Emotion, he argues, is the interiorization of affect toward psychological expression. Critical communication studies will no doubt continue to do so through the re-evaluation of language, affect, and perception. How might a philosophy, cultural studies, political theory, science, aesthetics, and communication of expression perform this tender work?
There are usually one or two texts that an essay is keyed into. He challenges us to engage in thought experiments rather than just deliberative critique and exegesis. These formal practices, while important, become humbled by how authors can nurse connections, tending to the sprouting of theories of change and change itself across texts.
These tendencies toward non-mastery, or flights away from mastery, allow for new thoughts, perceptions, and feelings. If they forced particular allegiances, or prescribed particular actions, they would be tools or weapons, not gifts.
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 23 December Brian Massumi and Communication works usher in new concepts and questions for scholarship about practice, power, the ineffable, and disciplinarity—especially of their relation and becoming.
The conceptual clusters and questions identified here are in no way comprehensive. Our writing remains speculative. Further Reading Boucher, M. Inter: Art Actuel, , 16— Hemmer-Lozano, R. Urban appointment: A possible rendezvous with the city. Manning, E. A perspective of the universe. INFLeXions, 6, — Markussen, T. Transforming digital architecture from virtual to neuro: An interview with Brian Massumi.
Intelligent Agent, 5 2. Massumi, B. Realer than real: The simulacrum according to Deleuze and Guattari. Copyright, 1, 90— Guattari, A thousand plateaus pp. Massumi, Trans. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Event horizon. In Gilles Deleuze pp. Stengers, Eds. Paris, France: Vrin. Requiem for our prospective dead toward a participatory critique of capitalist power. Kaufman, Eds. Sensing the virtual, building the insensible. Panoscopie: La photographie panoramique de Luc Courchesne.
The archive of experience. On critique. INFLeXions, 4, — The half-life of disaster. The Guardian. Buying out: Of capitulation and contestation. Collective expression a radical pragmatics. INFLeXions, 8, 59— Undigesting Deleuze. LA Review of Books. Artbyte: The Magazine of Digital Arts, 1 6 , 30— No title yet. In Le cabinet de Bracha: Carnets, dessins, peintures, scanographies — pp. Todoroff, U. The New Inquiry. Additional Resources Glendinning, H.
No such thing as rest: A walk with Brian Massumi [Motion picture]. United States: Performance Matters. Twisted Nietzsche. Relational soup: Philosophy, art, and activism. References Attali, J. Noise: The political economy of music. Original work published Barrett-Fox, J. Posthuman feminism and the rhetoric of silent cinema: Distributed agency, ontic media, and the possibility of a networked historiography.
Quarterly Journal of Speech, 3 , — Boyle, C. College English, 78 6 , — The forms of the affects. Chaput, C. Rhetorical circulation in late capitalism: Neoliberalism and the overdetermination of affective energy.
Cloud, D. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 99 1 , 1— Cvetkovich, A. Depression: A public feeling. Dean, K. First and last emperors: The absolute state and the body of the despot. Brooklyn, NY: Autonomedia. Heterologies: Discourse on the other. Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger: The Eurydice series. Deleuze, G. Difference and repetition. Patton, Trans. A thousand plateaus. Nomadology: The war machine.
Edbauer, J. Position no longer comes first, with movement a problematic second. It is secondary to movement and derived from it. It is retro movement; movement residue. The problem is no longer to explain how there can be change given positioning.
The problem is to explain the wonder that there can be stasis given the primacy of process. This is akin to late twentieth-century problematics of order out of chaos. The distinction between stasis and motion that replaces the opposition between literal and figurative from this perspective is not a logical binarism.
It follows modes of realitys passing into each other. Passing into is not a binarism. Emerging is not a binarism. They are dynamic unities. The kinds of distinction suggested here pertain to continuities under qualitative transformation. They are directly processual and derivatively signifying and codifying.
They can only be approached by a logic abstract enough to grasp the self-disjunctive coincidence of a things immediacy to its own variation: to follow how concepts of dynamic unity and unmediated heterogeneity reciprocally presuppose each other.
The concept of field, to mention but one, is a useful logical tool for expressing continuity of self-relation and heterogeneity in the same breath chapters 3 and 6. Embarrassingly for the humanities, the handiest concepts in this connection are almost without exception products of mathematics or the sciences. They must be ontogenetic: they must be equal to emergence. Social and cultural determinations on the model of positionality are also secondary and derived. Gender, race, sexual orientation also emerge and backform their reality.
Passage precedes construction. But construction does effectively backform its reality. Grids happen. So social and cultural determinations feed back into the process from which they arose. Indeterminacy and determination, change and freezeframing, go together. They are inseparable, and always actually coincide while remaining disjunctive in their modes of reality. To say that passage and indeterminacy come first or are primary is more a statement of ontological priority than the assertion of a time-sequence.
They have ontological privilege in the sense that they constitute the field of the emergence, while positionings are what emerge. The trick is to express that priority in a way that respects the inseparability and contemporaneousness of the disjunct dimensions: their ontogenetic difference. The work of Gilbert Simondon is exemplary in this regard. The idea is that there is an ontogenesis or becoming of culture and the social bracketing for present purposes the difference between them , of which determinate forms of culture and sociability are the result.
The challenge is to think that process of formation, and for that you need the notion of a takingform, an inform on the way to being determinately this or that. The field of emergence is not pre- social. It is open-endedly social. It is social in a manner prior to the separating out of individuals and the identifiable groupings that they end up boxing themselves into positions in grid-lock.
A sociality without determinate borders: pure sociality.
One of the things that the dimension of emergence is ontogenetically prior to is thus the very distinction between the individual and the collective, as well as any given model of their interaction. That interaction is precisely what takes form. That is what is socially determined and renegotiated by each and every cultural act. Assume it, and you beg the whole question chapter 3. Not assuming it, however, entails finding a concept for interaction-in-the-making. The term adopted here is relation chapters 1, 3, 9.
Possibility is backformed from potentials unfolding. But once it is formed, it also effectively feeds in. Fedback, it pre-scripts: implicit in the determination of a things or bodys positionality is a certain set of transformations that can be expected of it by definition, and that it can therefore undergo without qualititatively changing enough to warrant a new name.
These possibilities delineate a region of nominally defining i. Potential is un-pre-scripted. It only feeds forward, unfolding toward the registering of an event: bulls eye. Possibility is a variation implicit in what a thing can be said to be when it is on target. Potential is the immanence of a thing to its still indeterminate variation, under way chapters 3, 4, 5, 8, 9. Implication is a code-word. Immanence is process.
The distinction between potential and possibilitiy is a distinction between conditions of emergence and re-conditionings of the emerged. Conditions of emergence are one with becoming. Re-conditionings of the emerged define normative or regulatory operations that set the parameters of history the possible interactions of determinate individuals and groups. History is inseparably, ontogenetically different from becoming.
But if feedback from the dimension of the emerged re-conditions the conditions of emergence, then it also has to be recognized that conditions of emergence change. Emergence emerges. Changing changes. If history has a becoming from which it is inseparably, ontogenetically different, conversely becoming has a history chapter 9. The retrospective ordering enables precise operations to be inserted along the way, in anticipation of a repetition of the movement the possibility that it will come again.
If the movement does reoccur, it can be captured chapters 1, 2, 3, 9. It comes to a different end. At that terminus, its momentum may be diverted into a new movement. The backformation of a path is not only a retrospection. It is a retroduction: a production, by feedback, of new movements.
A dynamic unity has been retrospectively captured and qualitatively converted. Space itself is a retroduction, by means of the standardization of measurement chapters 7, 8.
Before measurement, there was air and ground, but not space as we know it. Ground is not a static support, any more than air is an empty container.
The ground is full of movement, as full as the air is with weather, just at different rhythm from most perceptible movements co-occuring with it flight of the arrow. Any geologist will tell you that the ground is anything but stable.
It is a dynamic unity, of continual folding, uplift and subsidence. Measurement stops the movement in thought, as it empties the air of weather, yielding space understood as a grid of determinate positions. The practices enabled by the spatialization of ground convert it into a foundation for technological change.
This is not simply a cultural construction. It is a becoming cultural of nature. The very ground of life changes. But it remains as natural as it becomes-cultural. This becoming-cultural of nature is predicated on the capture of processes already in operation. Putting up a new target to stop an arrow connects with forces of mass and inertia. The arrest of the arrow prolongs a tendency toward stoppage belonging to the ground, converting it into a cultural function the foundation, say, for an archery competition.
The anticipation of a next arrow prolongs powers of repetition also incumbent in nature, converting them into a basis for scoring.
The point is that the natural and the cultural feedforward and back into each other. They relay each other to such an extent that the distinction cannot be maintained in any strict sense. It is necessary to theorize a nature-culture continuum chapters 1, 9. Logical operations prolong and convert forces already in nature, and forces of nature divert into cultural operations normatively regulated rulered by the logical conversion.
Nature and culture are in mutual movement into and through each other.
Their continuum is a dynamic unity of reciprocal variation. Things we are accustomed to placing on one side or another of the nature-culture divide must be redistributed along the whole length of the continuum, under varying modes of operation, in various phases of separation and regrouping, and to different degrees of purity as was suggested for sociality; note that pure sociality is found at the nature end of the continuum, in cultures just-becoming, prior to its separations; chapter 9.
On the list of distinctions it becomes difficult to sustain in any categorical way are those between artifact and thing, body and object and even thought and matter. Not only do these relay in reciprocal becomings; together they ally in process. They are tinged with event.
The problem has been that the concern for naturalization was one-sided, only attending to half the becoming. Of tremendous help in looking at both sides is the concept of habit. Habit is an acquired automatic self-regulation.
It resides in the flesh. Some say in matter. As acquired, it can be said to be cultural. As automatic and material, it can pass for natural. Sorting out the identity or difference between law and habit chapter 9 , and distributing the result along the nature-culture continuum, becomes a promising direction for inquiry.
Of course, a preoccupation with precisely this question accompanied the birth of empiricism Hume. Incorporeal materialism has a date with empiricism chapter 9. Gender, race, orientation, are what Ian Hacking calls interactive kinds: logical categories that feed back into and transform the reality they describe and are themselves modified by it in return.
You miss the continuum of interlinkage, feedforward and feedback, by which movements capture and convert each other to many ends, old, new, and innumerable. The world is in a condition of constant qualitative growth. Some kind of constructivism is required to account for the processual continuity across categorical divides, and for the reality of that qualitative growth, or ontogenesis: the fact that with every move, with every change, there is something new to the world, an added reality.
The world is self-augmenting. Reality snowballs, as William James was fond of saying. Perhaps productivism would be better than constructivism because it connotes emergence. Inventionism wouldnt be going too far, for even if you take nature in the narrowest sense, it has to be admitted that it is inventive in its own right. There is a word for that: evolution. There is no reason not to use the same word for the prolongation of natural processes of change in the emergent domain of culture..
Is a constructivist evolutionism conceivable? An evolutionary constructivism chapters 4, 9? To think productivism, you have to allow that even your own logical efforts feedback and add to reality, in some small, probably microscopic way. But still. Once you have allowed that, you have accepted that activities dedicated to thought and writing are inventive. Critical thinking disavows its own inventiveness as much as possible.
Because it sees itself as uncovering something it claims was hidden or as debunking something it desires to subtract from the world, it clings to basically descriptive and justificatory modus operandi. However strenuously it might debunk concepts like representation, it carries on as if it mirrored something outside itself with which it had no complicity, no unmediated processual involvement, and thus could justifiably oppose.
Prolonging the thought-path of movement, as suggested here, requires that techniques of negative critique be used sparingly.
The balance has to shift to affirmative methods: techniques which embrace their own inventiveness and are not afraid to own up to the fact that they add if so meagerly to reality. There is a certain hybris to the notion that a mere academic writer is actually inventing.
But the hybris is more than tempered by the self-evident modesty of the returns. So why not hang up the academic hat of critical self-seriousness, set aside the intemperate arrogance of debunking and enjoy? If you dont enjoy concepts and writing, and feel that when you write you are adding something to the world, if only the enjoyment itself, and that by adding that ounce of positive experience to the world you are affirming it, celebrating its potential, tending its growth, in however small a way, however really abstractly well, just hang it up.
It is not that critique is wrong. As usual, it is not a question of right and wrong nothing important ever is. It is a question of dosage. It is simply that when you are busy critiquing you are less busy augmenting. You are that much less fostering. There are times when debunking is necessary. But if applied in a blanket manner, adopted as a general operating principle, it is counterproductive.
Foster or debunk. Its a strategic question. Like all strategic questions, it is basically a question of timing and proportion. Nothing to do with morals or moralizing. Just pragmatic. Vague concepts, and concepts of vagueness, have a crucial, and often enjoyable, role to play. Strangely, if this procedure is followed with a good dose of conviction and just enough technique, presto!
Thought and language bend to it, like light in the vicinity of a superdense heavenly body. This may be an example of miraculation. As if lucidity itself could be invented. These are just some of the directions that the simple aim of integrating movement into the account sets going: a lot of leverage for a small amount of applied conceptual pressure.
A lot of new problems. This is without even mentioning the associated problem of sensation. Briefly: sensation also presents a directly disjunctive self-coinciding hows that for vague?
Its simply this: sensation is never simple. It is always doubled by the feeling of having a feeling. It is selfreferential. This is not necessarily the same as self-reflexive. The doubling of sensation does not assume a subjective splitting, and does not of itself constitute a distancing. It is an immediate self-complication. It is best to think of it as a resonation, or interference pattern chapters 1, 9.
An echo, for example, cannot occur without a distance between surfaces for the sounds to bounce off of. But the resonation is not on the walls. It is in the emptiness between them. It fills the emptiness with its complex patterning. That patterning is not at a distance from itself. It is immediately its own event. Although it is non-simple or complex, it is not composed of parts. It is composed of the event that it is: which is unitary. It is a complex dynamic unity. The inteference pattern arises where the sound wave intersects with itself.
The bouncing back and forth multiplies the sounds movement without cutting it. The movement remains continuous. It remains in continuity with itself across its multiplication. This complex self-continuity is a putting into relation of the movement to itself: self-relation. The self-relation is immediate in and of itself, only its own event even though it requires distance to occur. The best word, once again, for a complicating immediacy of self-relation is intensity chapters 1, 2, 3, 4.
Resonation can be seen as converting distance, or extension, into intensity. It is a qualitative transformation of distance into an immediacy of self-relation. With the body, the walls are the sensory surfaces. The intensity is experience. The emptiness or in-betweenness filled by experience is the incorporeal dimension of the body referred to earlier.
The conversion of surface distance into intensity is also the conversion of the materiality of the body into an event chapters 2, 3, 6, 8. It is a relay between its corporeal and incorporeal dimensions. This is not yet a subject. But it may well be the conditions of emergence of a subject: an incipient subjectivity. Call it a self-. The hyphen is retained as a reminder that self is not a substantive but rather a relation.
Sorting out self-reflexivity, self-referentiality, and self-relation, and in the process distributing subjectivity and its incipiency along the nature-culture continuum, becomes another major theoretical stake. The feeling of having a feeling is what Leibniz called the perception of perception. That raises another thorny issue: the identity or difference between the terms sensation and perception chapters 2, 4, 5.
Leibniz notes that the perception of perception occurs without characters and therefore that memory does also. Then pause.
Memory, sensation, perception occurring without characters? In other words without properties? Without determinate form or content? What is a memory without content? One answer might be that it is just pastness, a pure pastness that would be the condition of emergence for determinate memory. But that would make the past contemporary to the present of sensation and perception. Leibniz goes on to say that although the perception of perception is without characters, it does carry a distinguishing sense of bodily direction.
Distinguishing bodily direction without a determinate form? That could only be tendency, pure tendency chapter 4. So there is a futurity that is contemporary with the pasts contemporaneousness with the present.