The problem of self-constitution of ego transcendental in Husserl's henomenology: from the Ideas I to Cartesian Meditations. Trans/Form/Ação [ online]. in his doctoral thesis and Husserl's phenomenology. his work to Husserl's phenomenological tradition. Meditações cartesianas e Conferências. MEDITAÇÕES ANTI-CARTESIANAS: SOBRE A ORIGEM DO. ANTI-DISCURSO 41 En Descartes o Husserl el ego cogitumconstruye al Otro (en este caso.

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PDF | On Jan 1, , Carlos Morujão and others published Apprehension of Relations and Predicative Achievements in Husserl's "Experience and Judgement" de Husserl entre as Ideias I (de ) e as Meditações Cartesianas (de ). Husserl Edmund Logical Investigations 1 - Ebook download as PDF Edmund Husserl Meditacoes Cartesianas Introducao a Fenomenologia. Husserl Ponty Body - Download as PDF File .pdf), Text File .txt) or read Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd As Meditações Cartesianas.

This research is inscribed in the realm of qualitative research in psychology, therefore in the field of psychology of culture. However, in considering the general area of phenomenological studies in psychology, regular criticism of classical phenomenology is observed, questioning some methodological assumptions adopted by Husserl, referring primarily to the works published during his lifetime. As conclusion, some equivalences between phenomenological archeology of culture and genetic phenomenology confers the first methodological guidelines for the study of cultural phenomena. Cette recherche s'inscrit dans le domaine de la recherche qualitative en psychologie et donc dans le domaine de la psychologie de la culture. Mas como obter o que permanece?

The property of being intentional, of having an intentional object, was the key feature to distinguish mental phenomena and physical phenomena, because physical phenomena lack intentionality altogether. Knowledge of essences would only be possible by " bracketing " all assumptions about the existence of an external world. These new concepts prompted the publication of the Ideen Ideas in , in which they were at first incorporated, and a plan for a second edition of the Logische Untersuchungen.

From the Ideen onward, Husserl concentrated on the ideal, essential structures of consciousness. The metaphysical problem of establishing the reality of what we perceive, as distinct from the perceiving subject, was of little interest to Husserl in spite of his being a transcendental idealist. Husserl proposed that the world of objects—and of ways in which we direct ourselves toward and perceive those objects—is normally conceived of in what he called the "natural standpoint", which is characterized by a belief that objects exist distinct from the perceiving subject and exhibit properties that we see as emanating from them.

Husserl proposed a radical new phenomenological way of looking at objects by examining how we, in our many ways of being intentionally directed toward them, actually "constitute" them to be distinguished from materially creating objects or objects merely being figments of the imagination ; in the Phenomenological standpoint, the object ceases to be something simply "external" and ceases to be seen as providing indicators about what it is, and becomes a grouping of perceptual and functional aspects that imply one another under the idea of a particular object or "type".

The notion of objects as real is not expelled by phenomenology, but "bracketed" as a way in which we regard objects—instead of a feature that inheres in an object's essence founded in the relation between the object and the perceiver. In order to better understand the world of appearances and objects, phenomenology attempts to identify the invariant features of how objects are perceived and pushes attributions of reality into their role as an attribution about the things we perceive or an assumption underlying how we perceive objects.

The major dividing line in Husserl's thought is the turn to transcendental idealism. Husserl tries new methods of bringing his readers to understand the importance of phenomenology to scientific inquiry and specifically to psychology and what it means to "bracket" the natural attitude.

The Crisis of the European Sciences is Husserl's unfinished work that deals most directly with these issues. In it, Husserl for the first time attempts a historical overview of the development of Western philosophy and science , emphasizing the challenges presented by their increasingly one-sidedly empirical and naturalistic orientation.

Husserl declares that mental and spiritual reality possess their own reality independent of any physical basis, [67] and that a science of the mind ' Geisteswissenschaft ' must be established on as scientific a foundation as the natural sciences have managed: "It is my conviction that intentional phenomenology has for the first time made spirit as spirit the field of systematic scientific experience, thus effecting a total transformation of the task of knowledge.

In the former, sense-perception in correspondence with the material realm constitutes the known reality, and understanding is premised on the accuracy of the perception and the objective knowability of what is called the "real world".

He identified several different kinds of names. For example, there are names that have the role of properties that uniquely identify an object.

Each of these names expresses a meaning and designates the same object. There are names which have no meaning, but have the role of designating an object: "Aristotle", "Socrates", and so on.

Finally, there are names which designate a variety of objects. These are called "universal names"; their meaning is a " concept " and refers to a series of objects the extension of the concept.

The way we know sensible objects is called " sensible intuition ". Husserl also identifies a series of "formal words" which are necessary to form sentences and have no sensible correlates. Examples of formal words are "a", "the", "more than", "over", "under", "two", "group", and so on.

Every sentence must contain formal words to designate what Husserl calls "formal categories". There are two kinds of categories: meaning categories and formal- ontological categories.

Meaning categories relate judgments; they include forms of conjunction , disjunction , forms of plural , among others. Formal-ontological categories relate objects and include notions such as set, cardinal number , ordinal number , part and whole, relation, and so on. The way we know these categories is through a faculty of understanding called "categorial intuition".

Through sensible intuition our consciousness constitutes what Husserl calls a "situation of affairs" Sachlage. It is a passive constitution where objects themselves are presented to us. To this situation of affairs, through categorial intuition, we are able to constitute a " state of affairs " Sachverhalt. One situation of affairs through objective acts of consciousness acts of constituting categorially can serve as the basis for constituting multiple states of affairs.

For example, suppose a and b are two sensible objects in a certain situation of affairs. For Husserl a sentence has a proposition or judgment as its meaning, and refers to a state of affairs which has a situation of affairs as a reference base. Philosophy of logic and mathematics[ edit ] Husserl believed that truth-in-itself has as ontological correlate being-in-itself, just as meaning categories have formal-ontological categories as correlates. Logic is a formal theory of judgment , that studies the formal a priori relations among judgments using meaning categories.

Mathematics, on the other hand, is formal ontology; it studies all the possible forms of being of objects. Hence for both logic and mathematics, the different formal categories are the objects of study, not the sensible objects themselves.

The problem with the psychological approach to mathematics and logic is that it fails to account for the fact that this approach is about formal categories, and not simply about abstractions from sensibility alone. The reason why we do not deal with sensible objects in mathematics is because of another faculty of understanding called "categorial abstraction. Thanks to "eidetic intuition" or "essential intuition" , we are able to grasp the possibility, impossibility, necessity and contingency among concepts and among formal categories.

Categorial intuition, along with categorial abstraction and eidetic intuition, are the basis for logical and mathematical knowledge. Husserl criticized the logicians of his day for not focusing on the relation between subjective processes that give us objective knowledge of pure logic. All subjective activities of consciousness need an ideal correlate, and objective logic constituted noematically as it is constituted by consciousness needs a noetic correlate the subjective activities of consciousness.

Husserl stated that logic has three strata, each further away from consciousness and psychology than those that precede it. The first stratum is what Husserl called a "morphology of meanings" concerning a priori ways to relate judgments to make them meaningful. In this stratum we elaborate a "pure grammar" or a logical syntax, and he would call its rules "laws to prevent non-sense", which would be similar to what logic calls today " formation rules ".

Mathematics, as logic's ontological correlate, also has a similar stratum, a "morphology of formal-ontological categories". The second stratum would be called by Husserl "logic of consequence" or the "logic of non-contradiction" which explores all possible forms of true judgments.

He includes here syllogistic classic logic, propositional logic and that of predicates. This is a semantic stratum, and the rules of this stratum would be the "laws to avoid counter-sense" or "laws to prevent contradiction". They are very similar to today's logic " transformation rules ". Mathematics also has a similar stratum which is based among others on pure theory of pluralities, and a pure theory of numbers.

They provide a science of the conditions of possibility of any theory whatsoever.

Husserl also talked about what he called "logic of truth" which consists of the formal laws of possible truth and its modalities, and precedes the third logical third stratum. The third stratum is metalogical , what he called a "theory of all possible forms of theories. We could establish theories of possible relations between pure forms of theories, investigate these logical relations and the deductions from such general connection.

The logician is free to see the extension of this deductive, theoretical sphere of pure logic. The ontological correlate to the third stratum is the " theory of manifolds ". In formal ontology, it is a free investigation where a mathematician can assign several meanings to several symbols, and all their possible valid deductions in a general and indeterminate manner.

It is, properly speaking, the most universal mathematics of all. Through the posit of certain indeterminate objects formal-ontological categories as well as any combination of mathematical axioms, mathematicians can explore the apodeictic connections between them, as long as consistency is preserved.

According to Husserl, this view of logic and mathematics accounted for the objectivity of a series of mathematical developments of his time, such as n-dimensional manifolds both Euclidean and non-Euclidean , Hermann Grassmann 's theory of extensions , William Rowan Hamilton 's Hamiltonians , Sophus Lie 's theory of transformation groups , and Cantor's set theory.

Jacob Klein was one student of Husserl who pursued this line of inquiry, seeking to "desedimentize" mathematics and the mathematical sciences. In his habilitation thesis , On the Concept of Number and in his Philosophy of Arithmetic , Husserl sought, by employing Brentano's descriptive psychology, to define the natural numbers in a way that advanced the methods and techniques of Karl Weierstrass , Richard Dedekind , Georg Cantor , Gottlob Frege , and other contemporary mathematicians.

Later, in the first volume of his Logical Investigations, the Prolegomena of Pure Logic, Husserl, while attacking the psychologistic point of view in logic and mathematics, also appears to reject much of his early work, although the forms of psychologism analysed and refuted in the Prolegomena did not apply directly to his Philosophy of Arithmetic. Leibniz and Hermann Lotze as inspirations for his newer position. Moreover, the distinction between the subjective mental act, namely the content of a concept, and the external object, was developed independently by Brentano and his school , and may have surfaced as early as Brentano's s lectures on logic.

Scholars such as J. Rosado Haddock , among others, have argued that Husserl's so-called change from psychologism to Platonism came about independently of Frege's review.

Contrary to what Frege states, in Husserl's Philosophy of Arithmetic we already find two different kinds of representations: subjective and objective. He includes here syllogistic classic logic, propositional logic and that of predicates.

This is a semantic stratum, and the rules of this stratum would be the "laws to avoid counter-sense" or "laws to prevent contradiction". They are very similar to today's logic " transformation rules ". Mathematics also has a similar stratum which is based among others on pure theory of pluralities, and a pure theory of numbers.

They provide a science of the conditions of possibility of any theory whatsoever. Husserl also talked about what he called "logic of truth" which consists of the formal laws of possible truth and its modalities, and precedes the third logical third stratum. The third stratum is metalogical , what he called a "theory of all possible forms of theories. We could establish theories of possible relations between pure forms of theories, investigate these logical relations and the deductions from such general connection.

The logician is free to see the extension of this deductive, theoretical sphere of pure logic. The ontological correlate to the third stratum is the " theory of manifolds ". In formal ontology, it is a free investigation where a mathematician can assign several meanings to several symbols, and all their possible valid deductions in a general and indeterminate manner. It is, properly speaking, the most universal mathematics of all.

Through the posit of certain indeterminate objects formal-ontological categories as well as any combination of mathematical axioms, mathematicians can explore the apodeictic connections between them, as long as consistency is preserved. According to Husserl, this view of logic and mathematics accounted for the objectivity of a series of mathematical developments of his time, such as n-dimensional manifolds both Euclidean and non-Euclidean , Hermann Grassmann 's theory of extensions , William Rowan Hamilton 's Hamiltonians , Sophus Lie 's theory of transformation groups , and Cantor's set theory.

Jacob Klein was one student of Husserl who pursued this line of inquiry, seeking to "desedimentize" mathematics and the mathematical sciences. In his habilitation thesis , On the Concept of Number and in his Philosophy of Arithmetic , Husserl sought, by employing Brentano's descriptive psychology, to define the natural numbers in a way that advanced the methods and techniques of Karl Weierstrass , Richard Dedekind , Georg Cantor , Gottlob Frege , and other contemporary mathematicians.

Later, in the first volume of his Logical Investigations, the Prolegomena of Pure Logic, Husserl, while attacking the psychologistic point of view in logic and mathematics, also appears to reject much of his early work, although the forms of psychologism analysed and refuted in the Prolegomena did not apply directly to his Philosophy of Arithmetic.

Leibniz and Hermann Lotze as inspirations for his newer position. Moreover, the distinction between the subjective mental act, namely the content of a concept, and the external object, was developed independently by Brentano and his school , and may have surfaced as early as Brentano's s lectures on logic.

Scholars such as J. Rosado Haddock , among others, have argued that Husserl's so-called change from psychologism to Platonism came about independently of Frege's review.

Contrary to what Frege states, in Husserl's Philosophy of Arithmetic we already find two different kinds of representations: subjective and objective. Moreover, objectivity is clearly defined in that work. Frege's attack seems to be directed at certain foundational doctrines then current in Weierstrass's Berlin School, of which Husserl and Cantor cannot be said to be orthodox representatives. Furthermore, various sources indicate that Husserl changed his mind about psychologism as early as , a year before he published the Philosophy of Arithmetic.

Husserl stated that by the time he published that book, he had already changed his mind—that he had doubts about psychologism from the very outset. In his Logical Investigations, Husserl mentions Frege only twice, once in a footnote to point out that he had retracted three pages of his criticism of Frege's The Foundations of Arithmetic, and again to question Frege's use of the word Bedeutung to designate "reference" rather than "meaning" sense.

Hence Frege recognized, as early as , that Husserl distinguished between sense and reference. Consequently, Frege and Husserl independently elaborated a theory of sense and reference before Commentators argue that Husserl's notion of noema has nothing to do with Frege's notion of sense, because noemata are necessarily fused with noeses which are the conscious activities of consciousness.

Noemata have three different levels: The substratum, which is never presented to the consciousness, and is the support of all the properties of the object; The noematic senses, which are the different ways the objects are presented to us; The modalities of being possible, doubtful, existent, non-existent, absurd, and so on.

Consequently, in intentional activities, even non-existent objects can be constituted, and form part of the whole noema. Frege, however, did not conceive of objects as forming parts of senses: If a proper name denotes a non-existent object, it does not have a reference, hence concepts with no objects have no truth value in arguments. Moreover, Husserl did not maintain that predicates of sentences designate concepts. According to Frege the reference of a sentence is a truth value; for Husserl it is a "state of affairs.

In detail, Husserl's conception of logic and mathematics differs from that of Frege, who held that arithmetic could be derived from logic. For Husserl this is not the case: mathematics with the exception of geometry is the ontological correlate of logic, and while both fields are related, neither one is strictly reducible to the other.

Husserl's criticism of psychologism[ edit ] Reacting against authors such as J. Mill , Christoph von Sigwart and his own former teacher Brentano, Husserl criticised their psychologism in mathematics and logic, i. According to psychologism , logic would not be an autonomous discipline, but a branch of psychology, either proposing a prescriptive and practical "art" of correct judgement as Brentano and some of his more orthodox students did [79] or a description of the factual processes of human thought.

Husserl pointed out that the failure of anti-psychologists to defeat psychologism was a result of being unable to distinguish between the foundational, theoretical side of logic, and the applied, practical side.

Pure logic does not deal at all with "thoughts" or "judgings" as mental episodes but about a priori laws and conditions for any theory and any judgments whatsoever, conceived as propositions in themselves. This is the case with all the distinctions of acts or forms of judgement, which provide the foundations for the laws of pure logic.

Categorial, hypothetical, disjunctive, existential judgements, and however else we may call them, in pure logic are not names for classes of judgements, but for ideal forms of propositions. Psychologists have also not been successful in showing how from induction or psychological processes we can justify the absolute certainty of logical principles, such as the principles of identity and non-contradiction.

It is therefore futile to base certain logical laws and principles on uncertain processes of the mind. This confusion made by psychologism and related disciplines such as biologism and anthropologism can be due to three specific prejudices: 1. The first prejudice is the supposition that logic is somehow normative in nature.

Husserl argues that logic is theoretical, i. It just expresses a truth. For psychologists, the acts of judging, reasoning , deriving, and so on, are all psychological processes. Therefore, it is the role of psychology to provide the foundation of these processes. Psychologists have the problem of confusing intentional activities with the object of these activities.

It is important to distinguish between the act of judging and the judgment itself, the act of counting and the number itself, and so on. Counting five objects is undeniably a psychological process, but the number 5 is not. Judgments can be true or not true. Psychologists argue that judgments are true because they become "evidently" true to us. This evidence, a psychological process that "guarantees" truth, is indeed a psychological process. Husserl responds by saying that truth itself, as well as logical laws, always remain valid regardless of psychological "evidence" that they are true.

No psychological process can explain the a priori objectivity of these logical truths. From this criticism to psychologism, the distinction between psychological acts and their intentional objects, and the difference between the normative side of logic and the theoretical side, derives from a Platonist conception of logic.

This means that we should regard logical and mathematical laws as being independent of the human mind, and also as an autonomy of meanings. It is essentially the difference between the real everything subject to time and the ideal or irreal everything that is atemporal , such as logical truths, mathematical entities, mathematical truths and meanings in general.

Martin Heidegger is the best known of Husserl's students, the one whom Husserl chose as his successor at Freiburg. Heidegger's magnum opus Being and Time was dedicated to Husserl. They shared their thoughts and worked alongside each other for over a decade at the University of Freiburg , Heidegger being Husserl's assistant during — Husserl became increasingly critical of Heidegger's work, especially in , and included pointed criticism of Heidegger in lectures he gave during He was above all the mediator between Husserl and the students, for he understood extremely well how to deal with other persons, whereas Husserl was pretty much helpless in this respect.

Husserl, in his obituary, wrote, "He wanted to draw only from the deepest sources, he wanted to produce only work of enduring value. And through his wise restrain he succeeded in this.

She then became his assistant at Freiburg — She later adapted her phenomenology to the modern school of Thomas Aquinas. Husserl, Heidegger e Merleau-Ponty fenomenologia. Ensaios sobre Edmund Husserl 6 livros para download em PDF Quando si parla di psichiatria fenomenologica o quantomeno di orientamento fenomenologico in psichiatria, possono sorgere dei dubbi circa le possibilita' di tale approccio nello specifico della prassi clinico-terapeutica.

Phenomenology Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ; Phenomenology is the study of structures of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view.

The central structure of an experience is its intentionality, its being directed toward something, as it is an experience of or about some object.

Principali autori e temi dell'indagine filosofica Si ripercorrono gli autori e i temi principali del pensiero filosofico da Parmenide a Husserl. Sono schematizzati i percorsi filosofici di Protagora, Socrate, Platone, Aristotele.

I cattolici Sant'Agostino, Tommaso D

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