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Begrebet Angest: En simpel psychologisk-paapegende Overveielse i Retning af. .. By Søren Kierkegaard. About this book · Terms of Service · Plain text · PDF. DAISY for print-disabled Download ebook for print-disabled (DAISY). Cover of: Begrebet angest · Begrebet angest. , Gyldendals Tranebøger. Dal concetto teosofico di angoscia al Begrebet Angest kierkegaardiano. Un abbozzo di percorso storico-concettuale. Luca Maugeri. NUMBER October
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In other words, does Christianity say to first teach about "the works of the flesh" the negative or about the " Fruit of the Holy Spirit " the positive? Should we always go backwards to review the negative or forward because we are concentrating on the positive. Or should there be a balance between the two? And he just puts the question out there as part of the "great dialogue of science" for consideration. He began this discussion in his Two Upbuilding Discourses of in Galatians chapter 3 There is neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, male nor female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus.
The individual does not relate himself to the ideal through the generation or the state or the century or the market price of human beings in the city where he lives-that is, by these things he is prevented from relating himself to the ideal-but relates himself to it even though he errs in his understanding of it.
God in the indefinite. Let us mock God outright, this is always preferable to the debilitating importance with which one wants to demonstrate the existence of God. One demonstrates the existence of God by worship-not by demonstrations. He asked the same question in Philosophical Fragments about how someone learns to become a Christian.
Are we Christian because of our family and personal history or because we have made a "decisive resolution"? What kind of goods is the Christian looking to gain? Isn't hope a good and despair an evil in yourself that you work to change into the good called hope? Isn't patience a good and impatience an evil that can be changed if you want to change it? Isn't your soul a good? Is the soul given to the chosen few or is it given as a free gift to all, without merit?
Kierkegaard answers this way: If a person does not first make clear to himself the meaning of "self," it is of no use to say of sin that it is selfishness.
Only when the concept of the particular is given can there be any talk of selfishness, however, no science can say what the self is without stating it quite generally. And this is the wonder of life, that each man who is mindful of himself knows what no science knows, since he knows who he himself is, and this is the profundity of the Greek saying know yourself, which too long has been understood in the German way as pure self-consciousness, the airiness of idealism.
It is about time to seek to understand it in the Greek way, and then again as the Greeks would have understood it if they had possessed Christian presuppositions. However, the real " self " is posited only by the qualitative leap.
In the prior state there can be no question about it. Therefore, when sin is explained by selfishness, one becomes entangled in indistinctness because, on the contrary, it is by sin and in sin that selfishness comes into being. Indeed, what is more, if the soul is this contradiction, it can be possessed only in such a way that it is gained and gained in such a way that it is possessed.
The person who possesses the external does not need to gain it-in fact, he is even unable to do that. He can give away what he possesses and then see whether he can gain the same thing again; he can use what he possesses to gain something new, but he cannot simultaneously possess and gain the very same thing. If the person who wants to gain his soul does not want to understand that when he has won patience he has won what he needed, what was of more value than any other winning, then he will never gain it.
It is already obvious here how secure this gain is, since in a profound sense it is so cunning that the more the world deceives, the more patience wins.
In this gain, the very condition is also the object and is independent of anything external. The condition, therefore, after it has served the gaining, remains as that which is gained; this is different from what happens when the merchant sold his merchandise and the fisherman has caught his fish-they lay aside patience and also their tools so they may enjoy what they gained.
In the former, the two factors are psyche and body, and spirit is the third, yet in such a way that one can speak of a synthesis only when the spirit is posited. The latter synthesis has only two factors, the temporal and the eternal.
Where is the third factor? And if there is no third factor, there really is no synthesis, for a synthesis that is a contradiction cannot be completed as a synthesis without a third factor, because the fact that the synthesis is a contradiction asserts that it is not.
What, then, is the temporal? The Concept of Anxiety p. If I were to say that to a third party, it no doubt would need an explanation, for it is readily understood that the pilot along the coast, the sentinel at the top of the tower, the lookout at the bow of a ship, and the robber in his lair sit and watch because there is something to watch for.
But someone sitting alone in his room-for what can he be watching? And someone who anticipates that everything-that is, the minor little affair that everyone else would perhaps disregard-will pass quietly, he, of course, is on watch for nothing. No wonder it is a strain for his soul and his head, because to look for something is good for the eyes, but to look for nothing strains them. And when the eyes look for nothing for a long time they finally see themselves or their own seeing; in the same way the emptiness surrounding me presses my thinking back into myself.
As soon as the actuality of freedom and of spirit is posited, anxiety is canceled. But what then does the nothing of anxiety signify more particularly in paganism. This is fate. Fate is a relation to spirit as external. It is the relation between spirit and something else that is not spirit and to which fate nevertheless stands in a spiritual relation.
Fate may also signify exactly the opposite, because it is the unity of necessity and accidental. Fate, then, is the nothing of anxiety. The category I maintain should be kept in mind, repetition, by which eternity is entered forwards. It provides him with two guides. The one calls him forward. The other calls him back.
They are, however, not in opposition to each other, these two guides, nor do they leave the wanderer standing there in doubt, confused by the double call. Rather the two are in eternal understanding with each other. For the one beckons forward to the Good, the other calls man back from evil. These guides are called repentance and remorse. The eager traveler hurries forward to the new, to the novel, and, indeed, away from experience.
But the remorseful one, who comes behind, laboriously gathers up experience. He wrote: "It is quite true what philosophy says; that life must be understood backwards. But then one forgets the other principle: that it must be lived forwards. Which principle, the more one thinks it through, ends exactly with the thought that temporal life can never properly be understood precisely because I can at no instant find complete rest in which to adopt a position: backwards.
Constantin Constantius wanted to do that in Repetition. Goethe wanted to start with the black plague in Faust or with the Lisbon earthquake in his autobiography. These are negative beginnings. Both Rossetti and Kierkegaard take this present age as a starting point.
Now the single individual interested in becoming a Christian can go forward toward a goal without continually looking over the shoulder. He wrote the following in and The healthy individual lives simultaneously in hope and in recollection, and only thereby does his life gain true and substantive continuity. Thus he has hope and therefore does not wish to go backward in time, as do those who live only in recollection. What, then, does recollection do for him, for it certainly must have some influence?
It places a sharp on the note of the moment; the further back it goes, the more often the repetition, the more sharps there are. For example, if in the present year he experiences an erotic moment, this is augmented by his recollection of it in the previous year etc.
Has time the power to separate us eternally? I thought it had only the power to make me unhappy within time but would have to release me the instant I exchange time for eternity and am where she is, for eternally she is continually with me.
If so, then what is time? It was that we two did not see each other last evening, and if she found another, it was that we two did not see each other last evening because she was out somewhere else. And whose fault was that? Yes, the fault was mine. But would I or could I nevertheless act in any other way than I have acted if the first is assumed to have happened? I regret the first. From that moment on, I have acted according to the most honest deliberation and to the best of my ability, as I also had done the first, until I perceived my error.
But does eternity speak so frivolously about guilt? At least time does not; it will no doubt still teach what it has taught me, that a life is something more than last evening.
But eternity will, of course, also heal all sickness, give hearing to the deaf, give sight to the blind and physical beauty to the deformed; hence it will also heal me.
What is my sickness? Where does this sickness have its seat? In the power of the imagination, and possibility is its nourishment. But eternity takes away possibility. And was not this sickness oppressive enough in time-that I not only suffered but also became guilty of it? After all, the deformed person only has to bear the pain of being deformed, but how terrible if being deformed made him guilty!
He was asked "almost petulantly" why it took him so long to translate the book. Alexander Dru had been working on the book and Charles Williams hoped the book would be published along with The Sickness Unto Death, which Lowrie was working on in Then the war started and Dru was wounded and gave the job over to Lowrie. Lowrie could find "no adequate word to use for Angst. Lee Hollander had used the word dread in , a Spanish translator used angustia, and Miguel Unamuno , writing in French used agonie while other French translators used angoisse.
I would say that learning to know anxiety is an adventure which every man has to affront if he would not go to perdition either by not having known anxiety or by sinking under it. He therefore who has learned rightly to be anxious has learned the most important thing. Is it dread, anxiety, angst, or sin? Or is the final word of the title something else. It's up to the individual reader to determine that.
If the single individual can't make a choice as to the meaning of a word then all choice has been taken away from the individual. Lowrie decided the book deals with "an apprehension of the future, a presentiment of a something which is a nothing" which must be fought against.
But fought on the inside with oneself about what "you" as the single individual can become. Professor Lorraine Clark put it this way in , "Existence is not just a given but also a task, Kierkegaard insists-the task of becoming oneself; for "actuality the historical actuality relates itself in a two-fold way to the subject: partly as a gift which will not admit of being rejected, and partly as a task to be realized" Concept of Irony, Hong p.
One cannot become all possibilities simultaneously in reality however possible this may be in thought, as he readily acknowledges ; one must become some one thing in particular. Otherwise, one remains abstract. In previous works Kierkegaard had already intimated that what furnished man the impetus to rise into the highest sphere and to assail passionately and incessantly the barrier of the paradox, or else caused him to lapse into "demonic despair,"  was the consciousness of sin.
In the book Begrebet Angest The Concept of Sin, he now attempts with an infinite and laborious subtlety to explain the nature of sin. Its origin is found in the "sympathetic antipathy"  of Dread -that force which at one and the same time attracts and repels from the suspected danger of a fall and is present even in the state of innocence, in children. It finally results in a kind of "dizziness" which is fatal.
Yet, so Kierkegaard contends, the "fall" of man is, in every single instance, due to a definite act of the will, a "leap" — which seems a patent contradiction.
To the modern reader, this is the least palatable of Kierkegaard's works, conceived as it is with a sovereign and almost medieval disregard of the predisposing undeniable factors of environment and heredity which, to be sure, poorly fit his notion of the absolute responsibility of the individual. Its somberness is redeemed, to a certain degree, by a series of marvelous observations, drawn from history and literature, on the various phases and manifestations of Dread in human life. Selections from the writings of Kierkegaard, Translated by L.
Hollander p. Especially is this characteristic of flourishing sectarian bodies here in America-groups which are able to number their adherents in tens of thousands. It is Soren Kierkegaard of Denmark who has provided the key to modern reinterpretation of this austere doctrine of sin with his analysis of the relation of sin to anxiety. Although Kierkegaard does not emphasize the word, he thinks of man in terms of his creatureliness.
Man's creatureliness lies in the fact that he stands between life and death. Made in the image of God, he knows what it means to feel the presence of eternity.
Feeling the nearness of eternity, utterly dependent upon it for his meaning, he also knows that he dies, and that he cannot escape death. These two factors constitute both his problem and his possibility of for immortality, creates his anguish or his nervous humanness. Man sins in that he is unwilling to live in faith and therefore to be nervously human.
He prefers to live either with life or with death but not with both. He seeks to escape creatureliness either by pretending that he will not die or by assuming that there is no eternity. He refuses to bear uncertainty and anguish. Either he turns his back on death by pretending that immortality is automatically a part of all life or he tries to forget his anguish by becoming an animal.
It is precisely this anguish, this willingness to live neither as an animal unaware of eternity nor as an angel indifferent to death , which marks the humanness from which we fall when we sin.
It is also this greatness. Knowing mortality, even while he hungers humanness, this willingness to risk death as we trust God, which signals the beginning of our redemption. Adler , Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, answered a newspaper question about existentialism asked in He was asked, "Dear Dr. Adler: What exactly is existentialism? Can a person be a Christian and, at the same time, be an existentialist?
Rational thought was no help; in fact, rational explanations are presumptuous and ridiculous, according to Kierkegaard, because no man can have his identity or duty shown to him by reason. This I saw, and I laughed. EO My life is absolutely meaningless. The only thing lacking is that the word Schnur should mean in the third place a camel, in the fourth, a dust-brush.
I would give more than my birthright for it! EO Similarly, "A" fails to achieve an appropriate relation between the possibility and necessity of his existence. He expresses a strong preference for possibility over actuality: "Pleasure disappoints, possibility never.
And what wine is so sparkling, what so fragrant, what so intoxicating, as possibility! If, however, the relation relates itself to itself, this relation is the positive third, and this is the self" SUD, Everything about the self is subject to an independent variable—namely, the stance which the self takes toward it.
Again the issue is, Does the self will or not will to be itself? This is also the chief issue in the second major subdivision of Kierkegaard's analysis of the forms of despair, which is entitled "Despair as Defined by Consciousness" SUD, Here he first discusses states that are really lower stages of aesthetic existence, where the reason that the self does not will itself to be itself is that This is also true of more "immediate" aesthetic individuals, except that their rxistence lacks A's self-awareness and dialectical complexity.
International Kierkegaard Commentary The Sickness unto Death it is unaware of being a self in any but the most superficial sense. He notes, however, that "it is almost a dialectical issue whether it is justifiable to call such a state despair" SUD, 42 , and his chief focus is on despair's higher forms. These fall into two main classes. The first is termed "despair in weakness" SUD, Here the self in a sense wills to be itself, but is yet in despair because it does not will to be the self that it truly is.
Every word of Kierkegaard's analysis here can be read as a prophetic critique of the atheistic existentialism of thinkers such as Nietzsche and Sartre. Or, finally, it may recognize that it cannot abstract itself from some "thorn in the flesh," some suffering or defect in its finite nature, but yet, refusing to accept any possibility of aid, will to be itself in its very imperfection as a spiteful protest against existence.
Yet I believe the link holds. For what this "ethicist" stresses above all, what he takes as absolute, is his own self as self-relation, as capacity of self-choice, as will, as freedom: lidity. Anything else but myself I can never choose as the absolute. Is it this thing or that? I choose the absolute. And what is the absolute?
It is the most abstract of all things, and yet at the same time it is the most concrete—it is freedom. EO Judge William's conception of the self as active self-relation, as freedom, in effect incorporates the first dimension of selfhood, the -.
The ethicist does not seem to make a clear distinction between f he freedom of the self and the "higher" aspects of the self as synthesis. At any rate, my claim is that it is a key for interfwting these works; I do not intend to advance any thesis about the development of his ideas.
EO only by God. The definition of the self as a "derived, established relation" expresses, he says, "the inability of the self to arrive at or to be in equilibrium.
It is that, despite the vague religiousness expressed by Judge William, the individual at the ethical stage of existence attempts to rely ultimately only on his own freedom, assuming for himself the power to make his own life right. He preaches, in effect, a doctrine of justification by works, the "works" in this case being expressions of an essentially Kantian ideal of universality and autonomy. It is this ultimate self-reliance that he has in common with the defiant types of despair described in The Sickness unto Death.
The self-relation and the God-relation are not—as Feuerbach would have it—identical, yet they go hand in hand. To will to be oneself in the fullest sense is also to take up an affirmative stance toward one's foundation; to despair, to refuse to will to be oneself, is also to turn against that foundation.
In more explicitly theological terms, to say yes or no to one's own existence as gift and task is to say yes or no to one's Creator. Two important issues immediately arise here. I have suggested that, according to Kierkegaard's definition of the third dimension of selfhood, every self-relation also involves a God-relation, whether or not the self is aware of its foundation in God.
Just what does this "transparency" mean? Has Kierkegaard anything to say to those who question this identification? Yet there is in his writings something analogous to Kant's "moral proof"—to the claim that the self's moral task is attainable only if God exists. He says: Kierkegaard makes it clear that the self's dependence on God is as much axiological as ontological. That this depiction must in some manner concern the self s God-relation is, of course, trivially true. But I would like to show that it bears an intimate relation to the whole definition of the self.
No, no, despairing lies in man himself. If he were not a synthesis, he could not despair at all; nor could he despair if the synthesis in its original state from the hand of God were not in the proper relationship.
The contrast between faith and " t h e ethical" centers on the question of a "teleological suspension of the ethical. All such standards—and, indeed, any standard that takes the human as its ultimate point of reference—are breached by Abraham's action. If Abraham is justified, it can only be because there is a higher source of obligation than "the ethical," one which at least on occasion warrants its "suspension. Take your choice, Johannes says; there is no neutral standpoint from which the issue can be adjudicated.
But a careful reading of Fear and Trembling suggests, I think, these reflections: The existential dilemma to which both infinite resignation and faith are responses seems, fundamentally, to be this—that every human self is by nature concerned with finite goods. Yet all finite goods are contingent and relative; none can be securely possessed; none can, without some measure of impoverishment or distortion of the spirit, be made its absolute end.
Were the self a god, it would or so our theological tradition implies in its infinitude transcend contingency and relativity; were it merely a beast, it would be so immersed in finitude as to be unable to conceive of its situation as problematic. What stance, then, can the self take towards its situation? Thus the "infinitude" of the self, its transcendence of the finite world, is manifested—though this attitude, however "deep," is a type of what The Sickness unto Death labels as "infinitude's despair.
For illustration he sketches the famous imaginary example of a contemporary "knight of faith" who 18 19 one would swear. And yet, yet. He resigned everything infinitely, and then he grasped everything again by virtue of the absurd. He accomplishes a prodigy, a "double-movement" of faith, a simultaneous movement of withdrawal and return in his relation to the world. And perhaps we cannot understand him, if to "understand" means to assimilate to our "natural" attitudes—for he is a challenge to these attitudes, to our tendency to alternate between immediacy and hopelessness.
Yet if to understand is to grasp his existence as a challenge then perhaps we can understand him. Only thus, by virtue of relating to God in faith, can the self exist as both finite and infinite, both involved in and transcending the world.
But some of his statements—as Louis Mackey has argued11—hint at a somewhat different conclusion. How, then, can the self deal with the reality of its own sin? Where can forgiveness be found? For in such a context, who can forgive? Can the self forgive itself? Such leniency would be highly suspect—an honest self would rather condemn itself.
The Sickness unto Death 21 yielding measures of its deficiency. A defect in the selfrelation, the self's self-estrangement in sin, can be healed only through its relation to God—only by divine grace received in faith. The two contrasts drawn in Fear and Trembling illuminate aspects of this "double affection. Similarly, the contrast between faith and "the ethical" suggests that faith both relativizes and restores the self's ethical self-relation. Only if the self stands related to a power and authority beyond itself can the breach that sin inevitably brings into our existence be healed.
Kierkegaard's definition of the self is a remarkable instance of his dialectical and literary skill. Yet it is more than that; it provides a key for understanding the structure and content of The Sickness unto Death, as well as the "stages" of existence depicted in his early pseudonymous writings.
It forms a crucial part of works that were intended to help his readers on the road to self-understanding and self-fulfillment. II Spirit and the Idea of the Self as a Reflexive Relation Alastair Hannay T he Sickness unto Death opens forthrightly enough by declaring that a human being is "spirit," and amplifies this by saying that spirit is "the self.
A human being is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity, in short a synthesis. A synthesis is a relation between two. Considered in this way, a human being is still not a self.
In the relation between two, the relation is the third as a negative unity, and the two relate to the relation and in the relation to the relation; thus under the qualification of [soul] the relation between [soul] and [body] is a relation. Perhaps, whatever difficulties attend an analysis of the notion, the notion itself is nothing more exotic than that of the selfevident ability of human beings to reflect upon what they do and think, and to form their own self-images.
It states elegantly, and I believe accurately, a crucial principle of Kierkegaard's thought—only, however, to the appropriately programmed reader.
By this I mean a reader familiar with the tradition from which Kierkegaard's terms derive their connotations: the Hegelian tradition. Hegel makes two sets of distinctions. Glockner Stuttgart: Fromann, ; Phenomenology of Spirit, trans.
Wallace Oxford: Clarendon Press, abbreviated Enc. Knox Oxford: Clarendon Press, The second distinction is between "natural" consciousness, or soul, and spirit. These passages contain all three of the terms used by Anti-Climacus in the opening passage of The Sickness unto Death to define the self as a self-relating relation. We have 'self,' 'soul,' and 'spirit. Let us begin with Hegel's metaphor of a path that the soul goes along to purify itself for the life of the spirit.
The "paths" of these possibilities are of different length; that of human life or consciousness is one on which the soul progresses through its "appointed stations" to "purify itself for the life of the Spirit.
But Hegel would want us to read it the other way around. Spirit is what, in the human case, this animating prin- 26 The Sickness unto Death International Kierkegaard Commentary ciple is destined to become. It is the human end-state, the human soul's "completed experience of itself" and "awareness of what it really is in itself.
What endstate would Kierkegaard propose instead? And what would be the corresponding Kierkegaardian life of the spirit?
This would allow us to see Kierkegaard's "journey" along the path of natural consciousness as merely an abrupted version of Hegel's. For, according to Hegel, natural consciousness proves only to have the idea, or notion, of itself as knowing not—as it itself believes— the reality of that; and for it the path to spirit proves to be one of loss of its status of real knower: "what is in fact the realization of the Notion [of knowledge], counts for it rather as a loss of its own self.
Hegel is saying that natural consciousness has to give way to spirit, which is for him the standpoint of science, from which knowledge of appearance has given way to "true" knowledge cf. It is clear, however, that this is not what Anti-Climacus would have us call the life of the spirit. Such a life would, in Kierkegaard's as well as Hegel's terms, be purely negative; it would involve no more than the realization of loss—loss of presumptive knowledge and of self.
Spirit, again for Kierkegaard as well as for Hegel, has a positive content; it involves the realization that human existence is grounded in an eternal telos. For instance we have the starkly unambiguous assertion that "the devil is sheer spirit" SUD, So it looks as if Anti-Climacus here employs a more neutral concept of spirit.
And since it is the devil's "unqualified consciousness and transparency," and the fact that in him there is therefore "no obscurity. Yet that is not so. Although like Hegel's natural consciousness the devil despairs, he does not doubt, nor does he suffer any loss of self—at least not as far as we are directly told.
Indeed Anti-Climacus says "[t]he more consciousness, the more self [and will]" SUD, 29, emphasis added , though also "the greater the conception of God, the more self.
In fact the devil does not despair analogously to Hegel's natural consciousness, for his despair is not that of uncertainty, but of "the most absolute defiance" SUD, 42 , and that presupposes not only a conception of God but something like a standing assumption that God exists and has power to exert. The devil could not be a defamer if there were no one for him to defame. And this seems generally true of what AntiClimacus classifies as despair. The despairer of The Sickness unto Death, the one who lacks faith, is one who will not affirm what is recognizably the standing assumption that God exists and that one ought to stand before God.
True, at the very end of The Sickness unto Death we are told of a form of despair, the axlminating despair, that denies Christ, "declares Christianity to be untrue, a lie," and makes of Christ "an invention of the devil" SUD, Moreover, that Anti-Climacus says this denial of "all that is essentially Christian: sin, the forgiveness of sins, etc.
Since for Anti-Climacus the opposite of despair is faith, it looks as though the end-state he envisages, faith, and the life of spirit are the same. Of course the humanly existing subject cannot know that it has God as the source of its powers to produce; at most its "becoming aware" of where it has them from is a matter of faith.
But then that, on this interpretation, would be the Kierkegaardian alternative to the Hegelian spirit's self-knowledge. To reinforce the interpretation we can turn to Anti-Climacus's remark that pagans "lacked the spirit's definition of a self" because they "lacked the God-relationship and the self" SUD, SUD, Should we say then that what we have here is Anti-Climacus's version of the life of the spirit in its properly positive guise?
In other words if Anti-Climacus were to claim further, from within this framework, that nihilism too was an invention of the devil, he would not be taken seriously by the nihilist; for nihilism denies the framework and so cannot be grasped by one who must consider it to be defiance in Anti-Climacus's sense. It appears then that Anti-Climacus's 'spirit' embraces not only faith but despair. There is much to support this interpretation. Unlike a normal illness where the issue of health or sickness is topical for so long as the illness lasts, within the category of spirit the issue is always topical, 'spirit' connotes a perpetual tension between faith and despair.
Apart from The Sickness unto Death itself, the reading is supported by most of what Kierkegaard says elsewhere, in the pseudonymous works and the Journals, about spirit. Spirit is also linked with individuality as such, and with the individual's task of fulfillment itself see, for example, Papirer X,4 A , ; JP 2: ; 3: ; 4: The passage with the translation slightly modified reads as follows: The human being is spirit.
The self is a relation which relates itself to itself, or that in the relation which is its relating itself to itself. The self is not the relation but the relation's relating itself to itself. Looked at in this way a human being is still not a self.
In the relation between two the relation itself is the third as a negative unity, and the two relate themselves to the relation, and in the relation to the relation; this is the way in which the relation between soul and body is a relation when soul is the determining category. SUD, 13 The passage may be read in three ways: 1 as a description of "health" faith , 2 as a description of "crisis," or 3 as a mixture of 1 and 2.
According to 1 , we read the identity of spirit and the self as the identity of spirit and the true self Anti-Climacus says that the "opposite" of despair, that is faith, is "to will to be the self that he is in truth" [SUD, 20]. In order to give point to the distinction between a synthesis in which soul is the determining category and one where the self and thus spirit is "positive," one must then say something like this: when the self fails to relate itself to itself and is in despair, then the fact that the true self is not related to is due to the soul's rather than spirit's being the determining category.
This could suggest a gloss on Haufniensis's remarks on the "bondage of sin" CA, In sin a person is willing to be "determined" by temporal goals and is in "an unfree relation to the g o o d " CA, Indeed Anti-Climacus actually says that when the human being is regarded spiritually it isn't just sickness that is critical, but health too SUD, According to 2 , spirit is not to be equated with the true self, but with the self aware of the options of health and sickness from the standpoint of either, though initially from that of sickness, that is the standpoint from which conforming to the true self is a task.
Here they are not yet selves because they have so far no consciousness of something "eternal" in them SUD, 62 , and since despair proper that is, as a "qualification of the spirit" [SUD, 24] is always "despair of the eternal or over oneself" SUD, 60 they have yet to reach the threshold of crisis.
Moreover, even in sickness that is, despair it is not true that the bondage of sin is a condition in which the soul takes over from spirit, for "despair.
However hedged around by "mitigating excuses," despair is itself an action of the spiritual subject unwilling to conform to its true self, the mark in varying degree of the open defiance of the devil's "sheer spirit. Alternatively, though much less plausibly, the mixed interpretation might invert the mixture and make spirit the true self and the reflexive self the essentially differentiated self in its travails. It is more consistent than the first with respect to what Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms say elsewhere of spirit and the self; and it is clearly more internally consistent than the third in that, in conformity with the text, it preserves the identity of spirit and self throughout.
As far as external consistency is concerned, we have Johannes de silentio's assertion that the world of spirit is the one in which one must work to "get bread" FT, Haufniensis, for whom 'spirit' and 'freedom' are interchangeable, says that the "secret of spirit" is that it "has a history" CA, 66 , and he talks of two "syntheses.
This is the case in natural human consciousness before spiritual consciousness emerges; but the emergence of spiritual consciousness is itself the idea that what appears initially to be a unity is really a juxtaposition of opposites. Spirit here is the 32 34 International Kierkegaard Commentary emergence of a problem.